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ON LARGE MODELS OF SYSTEW?* 
C. West Churchman 
This paper is concerned with man's ability to understand large social 
systems--governments, industrial firms, universities, hospitals, and the 
like. Specifically, it deals with the attempt to rationalize such systems. 
While the efforts of mid twentieth century to rationalize systems 
are not new, they are surely larger in scope and ambition than ever before. 
By "rationalizing a system" I mean the attempt to find out why the system 
exists--i.e., its objectives--and the optimal way in which it can attain its 
goals. 
The basic process of rationalizing is very simple. One searches for 
a central quantitative measure of system performance, which has the charac- 
teristic that the more of this quantity the better. The more profit a firm 
makes the better. 
better. 
longer their speeches the better. 
The more qualified students a university graduates, the 
The more food we produce the better. Ihe more speakers and the 
One takes this desirable quantity and tries to relate it to the 
feasible activities of the system. Each significant activity contributes 
to the desirable quantity in some recognizable way. The contribution, in 
fact, can often be expressed in a mathemtical function, that maps the 
amount of activity onto the amount of the desirable quantity. 
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courses we teach, the more graduates we have. 
the more food. The more conferences we hold, the more speeches we hear. 
The more fertilizer we use, 
We call the mathematics that relates activities to the desirable 
quantity the "objective function." 
gredient of our rationalization of systems, but it is not a sufficient in- 
gredient. 
anything that Americans like: cigarettes, popcorn, candy, autos, pool halls, 
bars, restaurants, schools, zoos and politicians. But in each case there 
are limits, largely arising from the fact that our cupidity is so diversified. 
Too many cigarettes produce a lessening of fresh air, which we want in more 
quantity. Too much candy lessens slimness, which we want more of. Too much 
of one product reduces the number of other products we can make. 
of any speech lessens the time that others can talk--and above all we all 
want to talk more. 
The objective function is a basic in- 
It is true that American culture loves large amounts of almost 
Too much 
I n  our rationalizations we handle these conflicting cupidities by 
We now say that we want to maximize the objective constraint equations. 
function, subject to a set of constraint equations. 
problem fits into an old fashioned mathematics most prominently associated 
with the name of Iagrange. 
mathematicians of a century ago ever envisioned. According to one account, 
we can handle a particular msthematical system with a million variables and 
thirty thousand constraint equations (by means of what is called the decom- 
position algorithm). 
the Texan syndrome: 
This way of stating our 
But in size w e  have gone far beyond anything that 
Applied mathematics of today can be characterized by 
it may not be very elegant but it is big. 
We can a lso  describe systems in many different ways: the functions 
can be linear or non-linear, the variables may take on discrete or continu- 
ous values, they may be deterministic or stochastic, and so on. The system 
.. 
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may look like a network of fantastic size, described in a dynamic fashion. 
When all our mathematical ingenuity fails, we can use large computers to 
simulate the system, and very ingeneious techniques to "search for" the 
maxima of our functions. 
All this must sound very impressive indeed, especially when one re- 
A t  that time there were no flects where we were a scant twenty years ago. 
techniques for the solution of even modestly large mathematical systems, 
except by old fashioned and extremely laborious methods. 
solve a set of linear equations with thirty unknowns by hand! 
Imagine trying to 
Grant that we can roughly measure the size of a mathematical system 
by the number of variables and equations, and that something like 20 vari- 
ables and ten equations characterized 1945, and 10 variables and 30,000 
equations characterizes 1965. If the growth is exponential, then perhaps 
by the time of Orwell's year 1984 we can handle systems up to 100 billion 
unknowns and 100 million constraint equations. 
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That would be quite a bit of rationalization. We should then, for 
example, be able to rationalize a large company like General Electric and 
its hundred or so divisions. 
large part of the Federal government. 
O r  we might even be able to rationalize a 
What can we say about this prospect? Should we look forward to a 
day when our government and industry win finally stop operating in a piece- 
m e a l ,  irrational way, and when all of the major interdependencies w i l l  be 
considered in a precise and rational fashion? 
see, is to write down what we Want our federal, or  local  government to 
accomplish, and a l l  of the reasonable constraints we wish to impose on it in 
terms of money, time, and other resources. 
computer code and the solution would tell each agency how it should behave. 
All we would need to do, you 
The model would be written in 
i 
i -  
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The model could conceivably be updated dai ly  or weekly, and there we are. 
Where? Has human in i t ia t ive  disappeared? Is  there anything l e f t  
i n  the decision process that i s  human a t  a l l?  
Well, of course there i s  s t i l l  a l o t  of humanity engaged i n  the large 
model rationalizing. 
t ions i n  terms of objectives and constraints. 
t ionalize what humans f e e l  they w a n t .  And, incidentally, i f  the humans 
write down ridiculous constraints, the models can t e l l  t h e m  this. By means 
of a technique often labeled as the "dual," one can judge how costly a con- 
s t r a in t  real ly  is, and hence whether it should be relaxed or tightened. 
After all, humans have t o  write down tne speciiica- 
A l l  the models do i s  t o  ra- 
Thus--in some age before us--we may perhaps merely say what we want 
and describe t o  a computer what we are able or willing t o  do, and our l a w s  
will be printed out f o r  us. 
they are, because we won't be able t o  follow through the enormous computa- 
tions--but we  w i l l  be rationalized--won't we? 
We won't understand why the results are what 
It i s  interesting t o  observe that the usual negative response t o  t h i s  
question seems largely irrelevant. 
quantify hhuman values, nor can we put our t r u s t  i n  the computer. But we 
can and do quantify values all the t ime ,  i n  terms of dollars, or numbers of 
people, or houses, or  deaths. 
genious and general way tha t  man has found t o  describe h i s  world, and there 
i s  real ly  nothing basically wrong with th i s  mode of description fo r  those 
who l ike  t o  use it. 
often intertranslatable. 
t ion,  t h i s  seems t o  be the total ly  wrong place t o  be suspicious. 
t h a t  computers can go wrong, or more accurately can be programed in- 
correctly, they are no different i n  t h i s  respect from other pieces of 
People want t o  say tha t  we cannot 
In fact ,  "quantity" i s  simgly one very in- 
Besides, quantitative and qualitative descriptions are 
And as f o r  a lack of faith i n  computer calcula- 
Granted 
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machinery l i ke  autos, a i rc raf t ,  and buildings i n  which we put our t r u s t  
without much thought at all.  Actually, more attention seems t o  be spent 
i n  the  computer industry on safety and r e l i ab i l i t y  than i n  most other large 
equipment industries. 
Bo, the question of whether we sha l l  put our f a i th  i n  large models 
i s  not answered by ei ther  a d is t rus t  of quantity or  high speed computation. 
The question, indeed, i s  a philosophical one, tha t  belongs t o  the very 
d i f f i cu l t  and generally neglected area of the philosophy of inquiry. 
not a new question a t  al l .  
Democritus i n  writings that did not survive, both seemed t o  have believed 
tha t  it is  possible t o  sweep the ent i re  world in to  an ever expanding model. 
Their belief was echoed down the ages--in Spinoza's Ethics, i n  nineteenth 
century mechanism and evolutionism, and now today i n  a philosophy that i s  
often used to sell system science and operations reseesch. 
said, can escape the eventual embrace of ra t ional  models. 
It i s  
Plat0 i n  the 'Pimaeus, and h i s  contemporary 
Nothing, it i s  
The trouble w i t h  t h i s  philosophy i s  tha t  it i s  wrong, dangerously 
wrong, pigheadedly wrong, philosophically inexcusable. 
say why it i s  wrong, because i t s  basic idea i s  so at t ract ive t o  narrow 
minded but b r i l l i a n t  thinking types. 
and ref lect ,  he i s  bound t o  see the serious f l a w .  
It i s  not easy t o  
But i f  anyone w i l l  pause f o r  a moment 
The f l a w  i s  an unforgivable neglect of the problem of infornration. 
The philosophy I 've  jus t  called wrong assumes tha t  information i s  "here," 
o r  i f  not here can be obtained. 
young psychiatrist  who addressed a group of patients i n  a mental hospital 
i n  a paternal is t ic  fashion. "WhWh, my friends," he asked, "why are we all 
here?" 
It's l i ke  the story of a very serious minded 
"Because," a voice boomed from the back row, "we're not a l l  there." 
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It i s  a common habit of mind t o  accept r ea l i t y  as something fixed, 
out there, 'chat we can question i n  various ways by means of our senses, 
o r  our senses aided by instruments. Indeed, the narrow minded sc ien t i s t  I 
referred t o  above l ikes  t o  c a l l  t h i s  r e a l i t y  "Nature" (he seems t o  shy away 
from call ing her "Mother Nature," but he often treats her l ike  a worn). 
speaks of "states of EJature" or "moves of Nature." H e  assumes tha t  Hature 
i s  a creature he can address questions t o  and from whom he can receive 
direct  answers. 
"plugged into" h i s  models, and therefore the models are r ea l i s t i c  because 
they simply describe the s ta tes  of Nature. 
H e  
Thus he a c t s  as though the f ac t s  about Nature can be 
W r t  this metaphysics i s  ut ter ly  naive, and i s  the very reason the 
whole philosophy of the model builder i s  wrong. 
very elementary piece of "information": 
an activity.  
t o  go t o  the records and add up the labor and material costs i n  terms of 
past  labor and material prices. 
not, because it may happen that  the prices paid f o r  labor and materials i n  
the past were the wrong prices: 
managed. 
out properly? 
senses do I use t o  obtain a direct  answer? 
you don't jus t  use your senses; you must a lso reason about the activity.  
Consider, fo r  example, a 
the cost of performing x units of 
One suggestion i s  How do I ask Mother Xature t h i s  question? 
I s  t h i s  an answer to my question? Clearly 
the ac t iv i ty  could easily have been mis- 
My real question is:  what i s  the cost when the ac t iv i ty  i s  carried 
But haw do I ask Bature t h i s  question? Which one of my 
The only reply seems t o  be: 
Consider another example. A branch bank is  a subsystem of the 
financial  system. 
nancial system of the U.S.A.,  and hence we sha l l  sweep i n  the branch banks. 
How? We could describe them in terms of customer requirements, and service 
uni ts  of various kinds, and our m o d e l  would then t r y  t o  optimize the opera- 
We can surely look forward some day to modeling the f i -  
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tions of the branch bank. 
to accomplish? Let's say that a large part of its objective is the storing 
and retrieval of financial information. 
system we need to do the job? It seems ridiculous to ask people to carry 
around financial information and transmit it in a haphazard fashion. 
Perhaps the whole subsystem should be redesigned. Perhaps we could easily 
eliminate checks and bank notes, which are surely very antiquated informa- 
tion devices. 
But vait a bit. What is this subsystem trying 
If so, is this the kind of eub- 
Bow note that a straightforvard model builder of the financial system 
would never have "asked Hature" any question about the appropriateness of 
the subsystem--he would simply have "inputted" the data he found. 
O f  course, we could design such questions into the model building 
process. 
has been well laanaged or whether the subsystem is appropriate. 
shall he get his ansvers? To determine whether an activity has been w e l l  
managed, we need to see its relationship to other activities. 
whether a subsystem is appropriate, we need to understand the whole s y s t e m  
of which it is  a part. 
We could insist that the  model builder ask whether the activity 
But how 
To determine 
How we can begin to see what is wrong with the claim that large 
models can sweep in all reality. 
use the correct information. 
correct unless we understand how the subsystems ou&t to be interrelated, or  
unless we understand the whole system. 
models are supposed to tell us. 
formation to start with in order to build our models, but we need the model 
in order to get the information. 
'we models don't mean anything unless they 
But we can't determine what information is 
But this is what our realistic 
In other words, we need realistic in- 
a 
In case there i s  some doubt about the seriousness of questions about 
subsystems, l e t  me repeat some very reasonable questions about large systems 
tha t  reasonable people are asking today: 
(a) do we rea l ly  need private automobiles and freeways? 
(b) do we rea l ly  need a very rapid transportation system? 
(c) do we rea l ly  need separate schools and universities? 
(d) do we real ly  need l ibrar ies?  
W e  can' t  go t o  Nature w i t h  all these "do we real ly 's"  unless w e  understand 
what the whole world i s  like--because lVature" doesn't give answers t o  these 
questions i n  a simple, unequivocal manner. 
Suppose we state the same problem i n  another way. If we are trying 
t o  rationalize a system, we must consider tha t  par t  of the system which is  
capable of implementing new plans. 
m o d e l ,  i f  the decision makers won't go along with the model's conclusions, 
the whole exercise i s  meaningless except as a purely game-like mathematical 
exercise. Now what questions can we address t o  Nature the answers t o  which 
w i l l  t e l l  us how we can be confident of implementation? The t ru th  of the 
matter i s  tha t  none of us know or even have a f a i r l y  good idea of the 
questions. Do we need t o  know 
haw t o  "communicate" better? Do we need t o  sweep pol i t ics  into our m o d e l s ?  
What i s  an optimal implementing system? 
these questions today--but they differ i n  the i r  answers, and none of them 
can jus t i fy  what they say i n  tenns of "facts" gleaned from Nature's re- 
sponses. 
No matter how finely we construct our 
Do we need t o  know how t o  "sell" new ideas? 
Lots of people are trying t o  answer 
The point seems t o  be that we c a s t  get "facts" about systems without 
making very strong assumptions about the systems. 
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Thus it looks as thou.& we're involved i n  aviciou cirole. We 
must get information to make our models realistic, but we must have general 
models to get our information. 
Row there's a very direct and practical way to answer all these 
philosophical questions. llhe answer is: be practice: A i i  this taik about 
the realism of the large model is fine in the abstract, but we've got to 
begin somewhere--so let's begin. The thing to do is start somewhere--with 
the feasible, and let experience modify our wrong guesses. Do samething, 
as long as it works. 
This seems to be the popular philosophy of the system science en- 
thusiasts in the political arena. 
to come up with a proposal for an information system for the state of 
California. 
it consider such questions as, "Do we really need a Department of Motor 
Vehicles," or "Do we really need educational records?" 
something that could be the basis of a beginning. 
osophy seems to pervade the application of cost-effectiveness analysis, 
or PERT, or any of the other techniques. 
some things we can do =. 
For example, a recent study was conducted 
How the proposal certainly wasn't a full-fledged model, nor did 
But it did say 
The same practical phil- 
They're all merely starting points-- 
The trouble with this pragmatic philosophy is that it's correct, 
absolutely correct--mainly because it doesn't say anything at a l l .  
says is "do *at is feasible." Bow if you don't know what "feasible" means, 
look it up and find that it means "capable of being done." 
wise and practical philosophy says "do what is capable of being done." 
some ways 1 prefer the opposite philosophy "do what is incapable of being 
done. 
What it 
So this very 
In 
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Ihe probleyn, of course, i s  t o  find out what can be done t ha t  won't 
ruin us--take us down the irreversible pathways of self-destruction. 
you t r y  to pin the pract ical  philosopher d m  t o  what he means by "feasible," 
he becomes very elusive, if  not downright abstract. 
that  i n  mathematical programming, a "feasible" solution i s  one tha t  meets 
all the constraints. 
feasible; fo r  one thing, "doing nothing at all" is often a mathematically 
feasible solution, but no one i n  h i s  r ight  mind would say tha t  a do-nothing 
program i s  feasible. 
If 
Maybe h e ' l l  point out 
But he doesn't mean this when he talks about the 
No, what our practical ,  hard nosed realist means by "feasible" i s  a 
plan tha t  "people w i l l  accept." H e  points out that  many plans based on 
elaborate models are not feasible because no one will understand them, and 
peuple w i l l  resist them because they feel threatened. 
The trouble i s  that  once the pract ical  philosopher moves away from 
h i s  favorite tautology ("do only what you CSD do") he gets into deep waters 
he himself doesn't understand. 
system. Resistance t o  suggestions i s  a part of poli t ics .  If I say, "pro- 
pose what people will not oppose," I'm t e l l i ng  you haw t o  conduct your 
pol i t i cs ,  aad my advice nay be very bad indeed. 
t r y  t o  avoid controversy are very bad politicians. 
philosophy of the feasible may real ly  be based on a naive or  even stupid 
po l i t i ca l  premise. 
Pol i t ics  i s  a subsystem of every large 
Sanetines pol i t ic ians  who 
The so-called pract ical  
Besides, I know enough about people t o  know how they love t o  deceive 
themselves. 
a chairman's remarking "I think XB can all agree--"! and on so many of these 
occasions what follaws the announcemmt i s  the most unbelievable ser ies  of 
How many faculty meetings I 've sat through that  have ended by 
. 
' .  
recommendations imaginable! 
especially since we all agree! 
We can all agree t o  do the stupidest things, 
No, 1 don't think we should base our planuing on what i s  feasible at  
all, sixply because t h i s  kind of down-to-earth pract ical  philosophy i s  so 
much up i n  the air without aqy guarantee tha t  it w i l l  f ly .  
What then? Should we abandon the attempt t o  rationalize human 
systems by large models? Certainly not. I don't l i k e  the "intuitive" side 
any bet ter  than the zealous rationalists. The intui t ives  l i ke  t o  say 
proudly and w i t h  t e x t u a l  inaccuracy, "our company jus t  grew l ike  Topsy," but  
"we've learned t o  f l y  by the seat of our pants" and %y a l o t  of work we've 
pulled ourselves up by our own bootstraps." The picture of a heavily booted 
and topless Tapsy driven by a turbine engine i n  her bottom, i s  probably 
typical  of the conscious confusion that goes on i n  the mind of the managerial 
intui t ive.  
ana ly t ica l  technology on the part of today's tup managers i n  industry and 
government. 
end computers in their planning i s  "beyond them,'' or  that  they don't need 
t o  know about these newer developments because they've gotten so far without 
them. They axe equally irresponsible i f  they expect t o  see 'bositive" re- 
sults fromplaxming models i n  one or two years at a minimum expenditure of 
t i m e  and effor t .  'Ity t h i s  l a t e  date, intui t ive managers should be realizing 
t h a t  an understanding of how their  organizations rea.lly work i s  a t  l ea s t  as 
d i f f i c u l t  as an understanding of haw a high class rocket works. Ue l ive  i n  
an age of model building for decision making, and w e  can make t h i s  age the 
most significant of ell t i m e  i f  we all work on the problem together. 
. 
There i s  less and less excuse for  an ignorance about modern 
They me irresponsible if  they pretend tha t  the use of models 
After having thrown out the pure model builder, the pragmatist and 
the intuit ive,  what have I got l e f t ?  One great asset of the human race: 
12 
disagreement. Controversy. 
I believe that  our fondness fo r  being r ight  and not being contra- 
dicted has led us into the acceptance of one of the three philosophies I 've  
ju s t  discussed. 
world tha t  he can adequately snd precisely describe mathemetically. 
pract ical  philosopher sees the world t o  be the world of action--of compro- 
mise and doing. 
made out of h i s  genius. 
H e  t e l l s  us what the world is real ly  l ike  and how we should cope with it. 
If our t r i be  were a smaller one, w e  could imagine that  these three myth 
builders might each t e l l  us the story of the future world i n  h is  OM way. 
Each would have h i s  heroes and h i s  bad guys. 
are br i l l i an t  men, scient is ts  who can carve f ine images of r ea l i t y  and i n  
The model building rationalizer sees the world t o  be a 
The 
The intui t ive sees the world t o  be one of h i s  ovn making-- 
W e l l ,  each of these world makers t e l l s  us a story. 
The heroes of the ra t iona l i s t  
the magic f lash of colored l ights,  have the i r  machines spe l l  out what the 
next worlds will be l ike  i f  we do certain things today. The v i l l a ins  of 
t h i s  story are i r ra t iona l  piece-mealers, selfish,  shortsighted, d u l l  of 
w i t ,  endowed only w i t h  power. 
The heroes of the practical  philosophers are doers--they get people 
t o  adopt t he i r  ideas--to change a l i t t l e  b i t  here and there--in one spin- 
off or another--towards a better technological world. 
man who wrote on the wall of the Faculty Club a t  the University of California: 
Ghenever it i s  not necessary t o  change, it i s  necessary not t o  change. 
Their heroes are simple folk, who can t a lk  sense t o  managers, who get things 
done, who accomplish change. 
Their v i l l a i n  i s  the 
The heroes of the intuit ives are the great leaders of gavermmnt and 
industry, the f ine grey haired stern fathers who grace our boards of trustees, 
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the judiciary, the professorial. 
speed i s  essential ,  deliberate when deliberation is called for. 
v i l la ins  are self-seeking interest  groups, or dissidents of one kind or 
another who don't recognlze their  proper roles. 
'Fhey are wise and quick t o  respond &en 
Their 
A l l  these story tellers t e l l  us fascinating tales, of horror or joy, 
of success or calamity. And whom sha l l  we believe and have t r u s t  in7 Who 
has the r e a l  insight? which qyth maker has h i s  ear tuned t o  God? 
Why none of then and ye t  all of them. We are the l is teners ,  and i f  
ve l i s t e n  well we sha l l  hear the differences as w e l l  as  the sameness. It i s  
not necessary fo r  us folk of the tribe t o  believe wholeheartedly i n  what 
m o d e l  builders say, any more than we need believe i n  practical  men or  wise 
men. 
t e l l .  
But we should l i s t en  most carefully t o  the story that  each has t o  
And this brings me back t o  the t h e e  of the large model. A large 
planning model i s  a story--it i s  one idea of wha t  r ea l i t y  i s  l i k e  and what 
it could be like. It i s  a marvelously told story in  i t s  way--not dramatic 
perhaps, but as a mosaic of detai ls  it i s  unsurpassed. 
l e s s ly  i n  the ramifications of the fabric of the ta le ,  touching on t h i s  or 
t ha t  episode and the way it will affect  our l ives.  
One can wander end- 
"be main trouble with th i s  type of story telling i s  tha t  the story 
t e l l e r s  believe they must be consistent. 
anything a t  all as  a concocter of t a l e s  should ever t r y  t o  be consistent. 
Certainly the man of action regards petty consistency as an anathema, and 
the  wise father-figures only use it as  a po l i t i ca l  device when it suits 
their aims. There i s  no reason why all. model builders have t o  t e l l  the same 
story about the sams system. 
How no story t e l l e r  wbo i s  worth 
This makes them very du l l  people. 
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I've a specific suggestion. We would all like to know whether the 
U.S.A. should stay in Vietnam, Some men of action tell us it's the only 
1 
feasible course because how can we pull out? Sane other 
us it's the wrong course because we must pull out. Saarre 
their beardless faces, say we must s t e m  the tide. Other 
,, 
.)I men of action tell 
wise men, stroking 
wise men say we 
must face the music. What do model builders say? Nothing. They are too 
shy. They are eraid that their "infonaation" or forecasts may be inade- 
quate, Nonsense. Let us build two model building story tellers. One w i l l  
tell us *at the world is really like and his model world will interpret a l l  
the data to show that our current policy in Vietnam is correct. The other 
w i l l  tel l  us what the world is really like and his model world will inter- 
pret a l l  the data to show that our current policy is incorrect. 
worlds these story tellers wiU. build are different, of course. 
The two 
It is up 
to us the listeners to see which one--if either--we are willing to accept. 
I'd suggest we try this model building controversy in all kinds of 
contexts--educational planning, poverty wars, health, urban development, and 
so on. After al l ,  debate has long been the common practice of practical men 
and intuitive men--why not of rationalizers as well? 
do debate aaaong each other fiercely, as any one knows who's worked in a 
lively team of uperations researchers. 
Actually, rationalizers - .  
One member of the team will push for 
one viewpoint, and find himself strongly opposed by his colleagues, The 
trouble is, we hideall this debate when we make our briefings. We think we 
should make one united, consistent proposal based on one model. The deoision 
maker, therefore, loses out on the really crucial part of our study, the con- 
flict of ideas that went into our model building. 
'L 
ht what of t ruth? whst is the correct answer t o  our pressing 
problems of human systems? Well, there was one American philosopher, 
John Dewey, who showed that the quest for certainty i s  bound t o  fail,  
because certainty is an unattainable goal. 
philosupher, Edgar Singer, who put the matter more deeply aad accurately. 
When we reach a conclusion after having exposed our ideas t o  the most 
severe test we can imagine, then ve have done the best that inquiry can 
possibly accomplish. 
There was mother k r i c a n  
